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Abstract 
 
Over the last two decades, trade union membership in Central and Eastern Europe has been in 
continuous decline and there is a common perception that trade unions in the region are weak. 
However, little is known about the actual relevance of trade unions for individual workers in the 
post-socialist world. We explore the role that trade unions played in protecting their members 
from the negative effects of the global economic crisis. Using data for twenty one post-socialist 
countries from the Life in Transition-2 survey, we find that trade union members were less likely 
than similar non-members to lose their jobs during the crisis. This beneficial effect of trade 
union membership was more pronounced in countries which were hit by the crisis harder. At the 
same time, union members were more likely to experience a wage reduction, suggesting that 
unions were engaged in concession bargaining. Overall, our results challenge the common view 
that trade unions in the post-socialist countries are weak and irrelevant.   
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Introduction 
 
The question of ‘what unions do’ (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) has been central within the industrial 
relations and labour economics literature. This literature, however, has been limited in its geographical 
scope. Although extensive knowledge has been accumulated over the years concerning the impact of the 
structure and practices of trade unions on the labour markets and individual workers of Western Europe, 
North America and Australasia (see Bennett and Kaufman, 2007, and Booth, 1995, for extensive 
reviews), much less is known for other market economies around the world. A major reason for this is the 
lack of suitable data, which has hindered detailed quantitative analyses of this kind. Moreover, the 
specific question of how unions protect their members in times of economic crises has been 
overshadowed by investigations which rarely stress the specific period/time dimension as a relevant 
variable in the analysis. This is apparent in the vast literature examining the impact of unions on 
individual earnings (or ‘the union wage premium’; see, e.g., Bryson, 2014), a detailed reading of which 
reveals only a limited concern with the business cycle.  
This paper tries to address both these gaps by examining the relationship between individual trade 
union status and the probability of being affected by the recent economic crisis in the post-socialist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Most of the literature studying industrial relations in the 
post-socialist world records the relative weakness of trade unions in these countries (see, e.g., Crowley, 
2004; Kallaste and Woolfson, 2009; Ost, 2009; and Visser, 2009). The main objective of this paper is to 
assess this widely-acknowledged weakness of trade unions in Central and Eastern Europe. To do this, we 
examine the relevance of union membership for individual workers during the recent global economic 
crisis and pose the following questions: Have union members been less likely to experience job loss, 
reduced working hours and salary reductions compared to their non-union counterparts? Have trade 
unions played a greater role in protecting their members in countries which were hit by the crisis harder? 
And what type of bargaining (e.g. ‘insider’, ‘concession’), if any, were unions engaged in?  
To answer these questions, we use data from a large survey (‘Life in Transition-2’), which was 
conducted by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2010 in all 
post-socialist countries.
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 The survey contains rich information on how crisis affected individual and 
household labour market outcomes, the respondents’ trade union membership status, as well as a broad 
set of socio-demographic and job characteristics. This information allows us to examine the relationship 
between union membership status and the probability of experiencing a crisis-related job loss, a reduction 
in working hours and wages, and delayed/suspended wages. As we have information on a variety of ways 
in which crisis affected individuals and households, we are able to test for the incidence of insider and/or 
concession bargaining (Tidjens et al., 2014). Moreover, with the survey covering virtually all post-
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socialist economies, we test for a differential role of trade union membership depending on the severity of 
the crisis in different countries.  
Our findings reveal that trade union members in CEE countries have been less likely than non-
members to lose their jobs, which is consistent with the role of trade unions as protective institutions that 
can shield their members from the adverse effects of the crisis. At the same time, union members have 
been more likely to experience a reduction in their working hours and overall wages. Taken together, 
these results point to the existence of some form of concession bargaining (where reductions in earnings 
are exchanged for job security). We also find that the negative relationship between membership and the 
probability of job loss appears to be stronger in the countries experiencing a steeper decline in their GDP. 
The results of this paper contribute to the literature of ‘what unions do’ in various ways. First, 
they provide empirical evidence that improves our understanding of ‘what unions do’ for workers in 
Central and Eastern Europe – a part of the world where such evidence is lacking. Second, they challenge 
the common perception that trade unions in the post-socialist countries are weak and irrelevant. Third, 
they go beyond standard analyses of the union wage premium or the union effect on other labour market 
outcomes, and explicitly consider the business cycle as a relevant factor in the analysis.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section presents a background to the research 
questions and outlines the hypotheses we test in the data. The following section describes in detail the 
data and variables we use, as well as our empirical methodology. Next, we present the results of our 
quantitative analysis. The final section concludes.  
 
 
Background and hypotheses 
 
Background 
 
Despite sharing a common communist past, the twenty one CEE countries on which we focus in this 
paper have diverged in their development of political, social and economic institutions (Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2007; Feldmann, 2006; Glassner, 2013; Kahancová, 2013; Kubicek, 2002). The three Baltic 
States have followed the neoliberal model (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007), characterised by market-based 
coordination of economic relations and, in reference to industrial relations, low trade union density, low 
strike activity, and fragmented bargaining that takes place mostly at the firm level. Similar features are 
observed in the Visegrád countries (the ‘embedded neoliberalism model’ according to Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2007), although sectoral bargaining is more widespread in Hungary, the Czech Republic and, 
especially, Slovakia. On the other extreme, Slovenia can be described as a coordinated market economy, 
4 
with high union density, high union mobilisation power, centralised wage bargaining and social dialogue. 
Industrial relations in the former Soviet Union countries – Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova – may 
still be following the former socialist model, with limited opportunities for the development of 
independent trade unions. These differences across the CEE region can be explained by historical factors 
(for example, before the fall of socialism trade unions were more independent from political interference 
in former Yugoslavia; see Grdešić, 2008) and the recent European Union integration process, which, 
among other things, requires the acceding countries to guarantee the freedom of trade union organisations.  
Although union membership decline in the last three decades is a well-documented reality in 
almost all capitalist countries (Schnabel, 2013), it has been particularly pronounced in the CEE countries 
since their transition to democracy (Crowley, 2004; Ost, 2009). A recent overview of industrial relations 
systems by Kahancová (2013: 60), focusing on EU member states only, reports that union density in EU-
15 declined from 33% in 1990 to 24.2% in 2008. In the ten CEE countries which joined the EU in 2004 
and 2007, the fall in union density was even larger: the respective numbers were 59% in 1990 and 19% in 
2008. Similar large declines have also been documented for almost all post-socialist countries of the CEE 
region (see, e.g., Kubicek, 2002, for evidence for Russia and Ukraine). Much of this decline is attributed 
to the passage from a system where union membership was de facto compulsory to a system of voluntary 
union membership and to the concomitant rise of the non-unionised private sector (Kubicek, 2002; 
Crowley, 2004).  
Irrespective of the country differences described in the opening paragraph of this section, there 
seems to exist a consensus that trade unions in CEE countries are weak, especially when compared to 
unions in Western Europe. Unions in post-socialist countries have been struggling to adapt to their 
radically different role within the new capitalist economies. Anecdotal and survey evidence suggests that 
people consider unions as ineffective, irrelevant and ‘toothless’ (Blanchflower and Freeman, 1997; 
Kubicek, 2002), most likely associating them with the Soviet-era institution which was mainly 
responsible for the distribution of (important at the time) social benefits – subsidised vacations, cultural 
activities, housing and childcare (Kubicek, 2002). Moreover, decentralized bargaining that mainly takes 
place at the level of the company, along with low overall union coverage and, thus, a large uncovered 
sector (Magda et al., 2012), are additional indications of union weakness within the industrial relations 
systems of these countries.  
Notwithstanding these broad accounts of the evolution and practices of trade unions and the 
collective bargaining system in the CEE countries, much less is known about what unions do for their 
members and if they still matter for individual workers. While declining union membership and 
disorganized, decentralized bargaining regimes may be an indication of an overall union weakness and a 
limited representativeness of unions in the employed workforce and the society in general, this does not 
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necessarily imply that in sectors and firms where unions still remain active their actions are irrelevant for 
individual union members (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2008). Moreover, apart from the fact that little 
empirical evidence is available on these issues, recent literature portrays a more complex picture. While 
earlier studies from post-socialist countries found a very weak impact of unions on wages (Neumann, 
2002), more recent studies challenge this view. Magda et al. (2012) study the impact on wages of industry 
and company collective bargaining in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and find significant 
positive effects of bargaining on wages. Croucher and Rizov (2012) report important heterogeneities in 
union influence at the enterprise level between the post-socialist countries and a positive correlation 
between union influence and union density (where influence is proxied by subjective evaluations given by 
managers).  
In theory, trade unions, through their bargaining function, should also protect their members from 
the adverse effects of economic crises by trying to secure both members’ wages and jobs. As noted above, 
evidence from Western economies mainly focuses on the union wage premium and the role of the 
business cycle is rarely touched upon. This may be the result of the way union preferences are represented 
in the standard bargaining models of economic theory, which assume that unions have constant 
preferences and place greater weight on their members’ wages (Gahan, 2002; Tidjens et al., 2014). This is 
essentially a form of ‘insider’ bargaining, where unions secure the wages of their members and employers 
adjust profits or employment (through the use of ‘outsiders’, e.g. temporary workers). Consistent with this 
theoretical framework, there is evidence for the existence of a counter-cyclical wage premium in the US 
and the UK (Bryson, 2014), while Tidjens et al. (2014) report that in the context of the recent economic 
crisis workforce adjustments were more often recorded than wage adjustments by employees covered by a 
collective agreement in Germany and the Netherlands.  
The view that unions mainly care about the wages of their members is, however, a very restrictive 
conceptualization of union preferences and practices. In fact, insider bargaining should also make sure 
that not only the wages, but also the jobs of union members are secured. Survey evidence has shown that 
trade unions have multiple goals and bargain for a range of different issues, and they very often negotiate 
with employers when the issue at stake is employment reductions (Gahan, 2002). Consistent with this, 
evidence from Western countries indicates that unions protect their members from job losses: union 
members in Germany are less likely to be dismissed from their jobs than comparable non-members 
(Goerke and Pannenberg, 2011), and the rate of dismissals is lower in workplaces with higher union 
density in Britain (Antcliff and Saundry, 2009).  
Much less is known about union behaviour during the recent economic crisis and its effects on 
individual workers. Tidjens et al. (2014) do not find evidence for ‘concession bargaining’ (where 
reductions in wages and/or working hours are exchanged for job security) in Germany and the 
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Netherlands during the crisis. On the other hand, there is some empirical evidence that unions in post-
socialist countries may have actually played an important role during the crisis period. First, Croucher and 
Rizov (2012) find that union influence in post-socialist countries is stronger during the downturn of the 
business cycle; such a relationship is not confirmed in their data for the UK. They explain this finding by 
referring to the historical legacy of communist industrial relations. The welfare (administration and 
allocation of benefits) and ‘legal watchdog’ functions of unions in these countries during the communist 
period remain significant today, and ‘demands for these services […] will likely be higher when 
enterprises are in difficulty’ (ibid: 645). Second, Glassner (2013) reports examples of concession 
bargaining in some sectors and companies in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Job 
security for their members may have thus been a prime aim of unions in CEE countries during the recent 
crisis. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Based on the above discussion, a set of hypotheses concerning the relationship between trade union 
membership and the probability of being affected by the recent economic crisis in the CEE countries can 
be formulated.  
First, a set of four hypotheses corresponds to the ‘insider bargaining’ role of trade unions. In this 
conceptualization, unions should have as their main aim to protect their members from job loss, a 
reduction in working hours or in overall wages, as well as from instances of wage arrears:  
 
H1: Trade union members are less likely than non-members to lose their job during the crisis.  
H2: Trade union members are less likely than non-members to experience a reduction in their 
working hours during the crisis.  
H3: Trade union members are less likely than non-members to have their wages delayed or 
suspended during the crisis.  
H4:  Trade union members are less likely than non-members to have their wages reduced during 
the crisis. 
 
Second, a different conceptualization of union behaviour assumes the existence of some form of 
‘concession bargaining’. Here, a reduction in labour income (either through reduced working hours or 
reduced, delayed, or suspended wages) is exchanged for job security:  
 
7 
H5: Trade union members were less likely than non-members to lose their jobs, but more likely to 
experience a reduction in working hours or reduced, delayed or suspended wages during the 
crisis.  
 
A final hypothesis concerns the expectation that the union impact on individual workers will be 
larger in countries that were hit harder by the recent economic crisis:  
 
H6: Trade unions played a more important role in shielding workers against the adverse effects of 
crisis in countries which were more strongly hit by the economic crisis.  
 
These hypotheses are tested in the empirical analysis that follows.  
 
 
Data, variables, and estimation strategy 
 
Description of survey data 
 
Data for the empirical analysis come from the ‘Life in Transition-2’ survey (LITS-2), conducted by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank in autumn 2010. Twenty eight 
post-socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Turkey, Mongolia, as well as 
five Western European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK), participated in the 
survey. The nationally representative samples consist of 1,000 respondents per country (1,500 
respondents in the case of Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Serbia, Poland and the UK). In each country, 
households were selected according to a two-stage clustered stratified sampling procedure. In the first 
stage, the frame of primary sampling units was established using information on geo-administrative or 
electoral units. In the second stage, a random walk fieldwork procedure was used to select households 
within primary sampling units. Respondents within households were selected randomly using a selection 
grid. The number of approached households was based on the final sample target (1,000 or 1,500 
depending on the country) and an estimated response rate. If the interviewer did not manage to interview 
a selected household (e.g. because no one opened the door) or a respondent within it (because s/he was 
not at home), repeat visits were conducted to ensure that the respondent takes part in the survey. If the 
non-response rate was higher than expected, additional primary sample units and addresses were issued to 
achieve the target sample size. Steves (2011) provides further information on the survey design and 
implementation methodology. 
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Given the regional focus of the study, we concentrate on twenty one CEE countries, which can be 
grouped into three blocs: 1) the new EU member states – countries which joined the EU in 2004 (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and 2007 (Bulgaria and 
Romania); 2) countries which have started accession negotiations or aspire to join the EU in the 
foreseeable future (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
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 FYR of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro 
and Serbia); and 3) countries in the European periphery (Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine).  
 
Dependent variables: the effect of crisis on individual workers 
 
In line with our research hypotheses, we create several variables to capture the adverse effects of the crisis 
on individual labour market outcomes. These variables draw on the extensive information on the 
respondents’ labour market status available in the survey, as well as a separate survey section aimed at 
ascertaining the effects of the crisis at the household level.  
Our first dependent variable is based on two consecutive questions from the labour market section 
of the survey. First, the respondents were asked: ‘Did you work for income in the last 12 months?’ If the 
answer to this question was affirmative, the respondents were asked: ‘Are you still working in this job?’ 
We create an indicator variable no longer working in the main job, which equals 1 if the respondent 
worked at some point in the 12 months prior to the interview but was not working in that job at the time 
of the interview, and 0 if the respondent was still working in her job. As in most countries of the region 
the crisis started in 2009 and the unemployment rate was rising in 2009 and 2010, we believe that much 
of the job loss captured by this variable will be crisis-related. Moreover, the survey also contains 
information about the reasons behind any job termination. In particular, the respondents were asked to 
choose one of the five reasons: 1) was fired or made redundant; 2) quitted; 3) the job was seasonal; 4) was 
temporarily absent from job; and 5) temporary closure (of the employing firm or workplace). We use this 
information to create a second indicator variable was fired or made redundant, which is a subset of no 
longer working in the main job, and captures the crisis-related job loss more closely.  
Next, we make use of the survey section containing information on the household-level effects of 
the crisis. The respondents were asked: ‘How much, if at all, has the economic crisis affected your 
household in the last two years?’ Possible answers are ‘not at all’, ‘just a little’, ‘a fair amount’ and ‘a 
great deal’. For all answers, except ‘not at all’, a follow-up question was asked: ‘How has the economic 
crisis affected you or other household members in the past two years?’ Possible answers included: head 
of household lost job; someone else in the household lost job; family business closed; working hours 
reduced; wages delayed or suspended; wages reduced; experienced reduced flow of remittances; family 
members returned from abroad; someone who was working took a second/additional work; increased 
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hours in existing job; someone who was not working before found a new job. We concentrate on adverse 
labour market outcomes and create four indicator variables: head of household lost job,
3
 working hours 
reduced, wages delayed/suspended and wages reduced.  
 
Trade union membership 
 
The indicator variable trade union member draws on the following question: ‘Are you a member of a 
trade union?’ Possible answers are: ‘Yes, an active member’, ‘Yes, a passive member’, and ‘No’. As 
people could interpret active and passive membership differently, we merge the two ‘yes’ answers. Thus, 
trade union member equals 1 if the respondent is a member (active or passive) of a trade union and 0 
otherwise.
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Control variables 
 
In all our estimations we include a range of socio-demographic and job-related control variables which 
might affect both the probability of being affected by the crisis and trade union membership status. At the 
individual level, we control for gender, six age groups and three education levels. At the household level, 
we control for the household position on a 10-step income ladder (as reported by the respondent), as well 
as a household wealth index, which is based on the information on whether the household has a car, 
secondary residence, bank account, credit card, debit card, mobile phone, computer and internet access.
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The survey also contains rich information about job characteristics – for those who were working 
in the 12 months prior to the interview, regardless of whether they were working or not at the time of the 
interview. We include controls for firm sector and ownership (state-owned firm, private domestic, 
foreign), firm size, industry, occupation (eight, thirteen, and eight indicator variables respectively), and an 
indicator variable for working informally (without a contract/labour book).
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Finally, to control for all country-specific factors which might influence both trade union 
membership and the likelihood of being affected by crisis, country indicator variables are included in all 
estimations. This ensures that the relationship between the variables of interest is captured at the within-
country level and is not driven by differences between countries.   
 
Estimation strategy 
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The model explaining the likelihood of being affected by the crisis (experiencing a job loss, reduction of 
working hours, wage cut or wage delay) for an individual living in a CEE country can be expressed as 
follows:  
 
Affected by crisis =   α0 + α1* trade union member + 
     α2* socio-demographic controls + 
     α3* job-related controls + 
     α4* country indicator variables + 
     error term                                                  (1) 
 
where α0 – α4 are the parameters to be estimated through regression analysis.  
As the variants of the dependent variable (job loss etc.) are binary, all model specifications are 
estimated with binary probit. We keep only the wage-employed (employees) in our final sample, and 
exclude farmers, the self-employed and those who had not been working in the 12 months prior to the 
interview. 
Our objective is to link the probability of being affected by the crisis and trade union membership 
of the same people. As information on both trade union membership and labour market participation (no 
longer working in the main job and fired/redundant) is available at the individual/respondent level, no 
sample restrictions are necessary. However, for the questions asking about the effects of the crisis at the 
level of the household, information is only available for the head of household (head of household lost 
job) or for any, unspecified, household member (working hours reduced, wages delayed/suspended and 
wages reduced). To make sure that the estimations capture the relationship between the effects of the 
crisis and trade union membership for the same people, we restrict the sample for the head of household 
lost job specification to heads of households only.
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 For the working hours and the two wages 
specifications, we restrict the sample to one-person households only. While these restrictions result in a 
considerably smaller sample size for these models, they are necessary in order to ensure that the 
relationship between trade union membership and individual labour market outcomes are estimated in a 
meaningful way.  
To test the hypothesis that trade unions played a more important role in countries which were hit 
harder by the crisis, we estimate a second set of specifications where an interaction term between trade 
union membership and the country GDP growth rate in 2009 is included alongside the trade union 
membership dummy. Given the difficulty in interpreting interaction effects in non-linear models, such as 
the binary probit (Ai and Norton, 2003), we estimate these models with the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method.  
Finally, as a robustness check, we estimate our models for three country groups: the new EU 
member states, the countries aspiring to join the EU, and the countries in the EU periphery.  
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Results 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the models estimated for all CEE countries combined together in the same 
sample. For each regression, we report the result for the trade union membership variable only (the 
regressor of interest); the full set of estimates is available from the authors on request. To facilitate 
interpretation, we report probit marginal effects – the percentage change in the probability of being 
affected by the crisis when the regressor changes by one unit, i.e. changing from zero to one in the case of 
the union membership variable.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Column 1 of Table 1 reports the results for the model explaining the probability of no longer 
working in the main job. The marginal effect of trade union membership is negative and statistically 
significant. Keeping other factors constant, trade union membership decreases the probability of no longer 
working in the main job by 4.3 percentage points. This is a substantial effect, given that the probability of 
no longer working in the main job is 9.2% on average (see last row of Table 1).  
The results of the model explaining the probability of having been fired or made redundant are 
reported in Column 2 of Table 1. The effect estimated for the trade union membership variable is again 
negative and statistically significant. Trade union members are 1 percentage point less likely to be 
fired/made redundant than similar non-members – again, a large effect relative to the average incidence of 
being fired/made redundant (2.1%).  
The positive effect of trade union membership on retaining a job is further confirmed by 
specification 3, which explains the probability of crisis-induced job loss for heads of households (Column 
3 of Table 1). Keeping other factors constant, heads of households who are members of a trade union are 
2.4 percentage points less likely to report losing their job due to the crisis than their non-member 
counterparts. Again, relative to the mean of the dependent variable (8.6%), this effect is substantial, 
although somewhat smaller in relative terms than the effects estimated for the first two job loss related 
variables.  
Overall, the results for the three job loss related specifications provide strong support for 
hypothesis H1: trade union members were less likely than non-members to lose their jobs during the crisis 
in the CEE countries. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that trade union membership has 
been an effective protective mechanism for CEE workers during the recent downturn of the business 
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cycle. It is also in line with evidence from Western Europe (Goerke and Pannenberg, 2011; Antcliff and 
Saundry, 2009) that refers to the pre-crisis period.   
Looking at the effects of crisis on other labour market outcomes, trade union members were 5.8 
percentage points more likely to have their working hours reduced compared with non-members (Column 
4 of Table 1). This effect is less precisely estimated than the effects associated with the job loss 
specifications (only significant at the 0.10 level), but it is large relative to the average incidence of 
experiencing reduced working hours in our sample (11.7%). In contrast, the marginal effect of trade union 
membership is positive but statistically insignificant in the delayed/suspended wages specification 
(Column 5 of Table 1). This implies that trade union members were as likely to see their wages delayed or 
suspended as non-members. Finally, trade union members were 9.4 percentage points more likely than 
non-members to see their wages reduced (Column 6 of Table 1). This effect, significant at the 0.05 level, 
is equivalent to approximately one fifth of the average incidence of receiving reduced wages during the 
crisis in the CEE countries (46%).  
These results thus reject hypotheses H2, H3 and H4. Trade union membership does not seem to 
have protected employees from experiencing reduced working hours, and delayed, suspended or reduced 
wages in the CEE countries. However, taken together, the results of Table 1 lend support to hypothesis 
H5. The evidence provided is consistent with the hypothesis that trade unions engaged in ‘concession 
bargaining’: relative to non-members, trade union members were less likely to lose their jobs, but more 
likely to experience reduced working hours and wages.  
Next, we turn to testing the hypothesis that trade unions played a more important role in countries 
which were hit by the crisis to a greater extent. The results of the estimations which include the union 
membership and GDP growth interaction term are reported in Table 2. In specification 1, which explains 
the probability of no longer working in the main job, the coefficient of the trade union membership is 
negative, the interaction term is positive, and both are statistically significant. This means that the positive 
relationship between trade union membership and the probability of keeping one’s job was amplified by a 
country’s GDP fall in 2009 – unions appear more effective in countries which were hit by the crisis 
harder. For example, the model predicts that in Latvia, the country in our sample that was hit by the crisis 
the hardest (GDP fell by 18% in 2009), trade union members were 7.6 percentage points less likely (and 
significantly so) to report that they stopped working relative to non-members.
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 This difference gets 
smaller as a country’s GDP growth rate in 2009 gets higher. In Albania, which recorded the highest GDP 
growth rate in 2009 (3.3%) among the countries in our sample, trade union members were equally likely 
as non-members to report that they were no longer working in their main job (the difference of -0.6 
percentage points is statistically insignificant) . 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
A positive and statistically significant interaction term, along with a statistically insignificant 
coefficient of trade union membership, is found in the model which explains the probability of the crisis-
induced job loss of the head of household (Column 3 of Table 2). This further confirms that trade unions 
were more instrumental in saving their members’ jobs in countries which were affected by the crisis to a 
greater extent. However, the interaction term is statistically insignificant in the model explaining the 
likelihood of being fired/made redundant (Column 2 of Table 2). In conjunction with a negative and 
significant coefficient of the trade union membership dummy, this result suggests that members of trade 
unions were less likely to be fired or made redundant than non-members regardless of the extent to which 
the country was affected by the economic crisis.  
The interaction terms are also insignificant in the models explaining the probability of 
experiencing reduced working hours and reduced wages, while the trade union membership dummy in 
both cases is positive and statistically significant (Columns 4 and 6 of Table 2). This means that, 
regardless of GDP growth in 2009, trade union members were more likely to work fewer hours and 
receive lower wages than before the crisis than non-members, leaving our conclusions derived from the 
baseline specifications in Table 1 unchanged.       
An interesting result emerges in the model explaining the likelihood of experiencing delayed or 
suspended wages. Recall that in the baseline specification the coefficient of trade union membership was 
statistically insignificant (Column 5 of Table 1), meaning that, on average, trade union members were as 
likely as non-members to experience delayed and/or suspended wages. However, including the interaction 
term reveals an effect of trade union membership that depends on the depth of the crisis experienced by 
each country. Both the trade union dummy and the interaction term are positive and statistically 
significant (Column 5 of Table 2), with the final effect of trade union membership shifting from positive 
to negative as the extent by which a country was hit by the crisis increases. Specifically, relative to non-
members, trade union members were around 18 percentage points more likely than non-members to see 
their wages delayed or reduced in the country with the highest GDP growth in our sample (Albania) and 
8.2 percentage points less likely to do so in the country with the lowest GDP growth (Latvia); both 
differences are statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  
Taken together, the above results provide only partial support for H6. The evidence presented is 
consistent with the hypothesis that trade unions played a greater role in shielding against job losses and 
delayed/suspended wages in countries affected by the crisis to a greater extent. However, the baseline 
result of a positive relationship between trade union membership and experiencing reduced working hours 
or reduced wages appears to be independent of the depth of the crisis in CEE countries.  
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Robustness checks 
 
Up to now, all our models were estimated for the full set of twenty one CEE countries included together 
in the same sample. To examine the robustness of our baseline results, our final set of regressions 
separately estimate the baseline models for three geopolitical blocs: the EU member states, the countries 
that aspire to join the EU in the foreseeable future, and the countries in the EU periphery. The results, 
reported in Table 3, suggest that in all three country groupings trade union membership is correlated with 
a reduced probability of no longer working in the main job (Column 1). However, trade union members 
were less likely than non-members to be fired or made redundant only in the EU periphery – the marginal 
effects in the two other groups are negative but statistically insignificant (Column 2). Conversely, in the 
model explaining job loss of the head of household, the marginal effect of trade union membership is 
negative and significant in the new and aspiring EU countries, but statistically insignificant (although also 
negative) in the EU periphery (Column 3). Taken together, it appears that, for some measure or another, 
the result of a reduced probability of losing one’s job among trade union members holds for all three 
geopolitical blocs.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
More prominent country-group differences are obtained in the models explaining the other three 
individual labour market outcomes (Columns 4-6). For the new EU member states, the marginal effect of 
the trade union membership variable is insignificant in all three specifications, meaning that union 
members are equally likely to experience reduced working hours, delayed or suspended wages, or reduced 
wages as non-members. In contrast, the marginal effect is positive, statistically significant and 
substantively large in all three models for the countries aspiring to join the EU. In the EU periphery, trade 
union members are more likely than non-members to have experienced a wage reduction due to the crisis, 
but experienced neither reduced working hours nor delayed/suspended wages.  
To sum up, trade union members were less likely than comparable non-members to lose their jobs 
across the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe. However, a positive relationship between trade 
union membership and working reduced working hours, as well as experiencing delayed/suspended 
wages, is observed only for the aspiring EU states of Western Balkans. Finally, the positive association 
between trade union membership and reduced wages observed in the pooled sample is driven by the 
Western Balkans and the countries of the EU periphery. These differences across the three geopolitical 
groups are intriguing and require further analysis which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper has studied the question of whether trade unions protected their members from the adverse 
effects of the global economic crisis in the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In 
doing so, it addressed two gaps in the literature: first, it examined the relevance of trade unions for 
individual workers in an under-explored part of the world, the post-socialist European economies; and, 
second, it explicitly dealt with a specific time period, the recent global economic crisis, and investigated if 
and how trade unions protected their members from its adverse effects. The regression analysis of the 
relationship between individual trade union membership and the probability of being affected by the crisis 
was based on data from a large representative survey conducted in twenty one Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
Our results indicate that, during the recent crisis, union members in the post-socialist countries 
were less likely than similar non-members to lose their jobs, but more likely to experience a reduction in 
their working hours and salary. These findings are consistent with the existence of concession bargaining 
during the crisis, where trade unions exchanged a reduction in their members’ overall pay for job security. 
We also find that the larger the decline in a country’s GDP, the less likely union members are to lose their 
jobs. Considering regional differences, we find that union members were less likely than non-members to 
lose their jobs across the whole European post-socialist space – in the countries which have recently 
joined the EU, in the aspiring EU member states, and in the countries on the European periphery. 
However, a greater probability of receiving a salary reduction among members was only observed in the 
aspiring EU states and on the European periphery. 
Taken together, our results challenge the general view that trade unions in Central and Eastern 
Europe are weak and irrelevant. Corroborating the conclusions from recent empirical research in this area 
(e.g., Magda et al., 2012), it appears that unions in the post-socialist countries have been successful in 
protecting their members from job losses during the crisis and that they have done so more effectively in 
countries that experienced worse economic conditions. One implication of these findings is that the crisis 
may have increased the relevance of union membership in the eyes of individual workers, which 
eventually could convince more workers to join a union. Kallaste and Woolfson (2009) have recently 
pointed out that a sizable group of workers in the post-socialist countries are undecided about joining a 
union, since they do not know what role unions play and if they can effectively represent their members’ 
interests. The results of our paper indicate that unions do matter for individual workers and that, with 
appropriate organizing drives, the large decline in membership observed in the last two decades could be 
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reversed. This opens new questions: Have workers become better informed after the crisis about what 
trade unions do? Has trust in unions increased? Has actual membership increased, especially in the 
countries and sectors which suffered most from the crisis? These questions are left for future research. 
Finally, we should note that our work is not without limitations. First, the evidence we provide 
can only be suggestive for the hypotheses we test. Exact causal effects of union membership on the 
probability of being affected by the crisis cannot be identified with cross-sectional data. This is an 
endemic problem in the literature studying the union impact on labour market outcomes (Bryson, 2014), 
since the process of becoming a trade union member is not random and there could be unobserved worker 
characteristics which drive both the selection into union membership and the likelihood of being affected 
by the crisis. Future research would need to make use of richer – preferably longitudinal – data, which 
would allow controlling for such confounding effects.  
Second, our study looks at the overall relationship between union membership and specific labour 
market outcomes across twenty one Central and East European countries. A focus on such a broad region 
does not enable a more detailed look at the specific ways trade unions and the overall industrial relations 
systems function in each of these countries. Although we have identified some similarities and differences 
in the relationships of interest between the three geo-political blocs of the region, more work – both 
quantitative and qualitative – is necessary to explain these results and uncover any differences between 
individual countries.  
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Notes 
                                               
1
 The survey has recently been used to examine entrepreneurship (Nikolova and Simroth, 2015), preferences for 
redistribution (Cojocaru, 2014), political attitudes (Grosjean et al., 2013) and corruption (Ivlevs and Hinks, 2015) in 
CEE countries. 
2
 Note that Croatia joined the EU in 2013 and was not an EU member state at the year of the interviews (2010).  
3
 We cannot use the information on whether someone else in the household lost job, as in this case it is impossible to 
identify the person who lost the job.  
4
 Note that the information on whether the respondent was a trade union member is available only for the time of the 
interview. This can be a concern for our analysis. If recently unemployed union members are not allowed to stay 
in/drop from the union when losing their job, linking job loss to union membership could produce biased results. 
However, we believe that leaving a union after losing a job is unlikely to be the case here, especially in the post-
socialist countries. As trade unions in this part of the world are interested in reporting and retaining maximum 
membership, non-working pensioners, students and the unemployed are encouraged to stay in the unions (and they 
usually have to pay a significantly lower or zero membership fee). The recently unemployed would arguably be 
interested in staying in the union, hoping that it might help their situation in one way or another. Finally, if people 
belong to a sectoral or occupational rather than a company-level union, they would not necessarily leave the union if 
they lose a job in a particular firm. 
5
 The index is constructed using principal components analysis. 
6
 Summary statistics for all the control variables we use are available from the authors on request.  
7
 In 55% of cases the respondents in the survey were the heads of the household.  
8
 This number is obtained by the following calculation: -0.017+0.0033*(-18) = -7.6 p.p., where -18 (%) is the GDP 
growth rate in Latvia in 2009 and the rest of the numbers are the estimated coefficients in Column 1 of Table 2. The 
same calculations are used for the rest of the effects reported below that refer to the specifications with the 
interaction term.  
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Table 1. Trade union membership and the effects of the crisis – probit marginal effects 
 No longer 
working in the 
main job 
Was fired or 
made 
redundant 
Head of 
household lost 
job due to crisis 
Working hours 
reduced 
Wages delayed 
or suspended 
Wages 
reduced 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Trade union member -0.043*** -0.010*** -0.024*** 0.058* 0.048 0.094** 
       
Socio-demographic controls       
Job/firm characteristics       
Country indicators       
       
Observations 9,497 9,488 5,443 1,192 1,233 1,248 
Pseudo R2 0.177 0.124 0.148 0.151 0.092 0.137 
Wald Chi2 (Prob > Chi2) 938.2 (0.000) 279.7 (0.000) 428.8 (0.000) 135.9 (0.000) 106.3 (0.000) 214.9 (0.000) 
       
Mean of the dependent variable 0.092 0.021 0.086 0.117 0.162 0.460 
       
 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors used to calculate the regressors’ level of significance. Average marginal effects 
reported. All regressions include the wage-employed only. Specification 3 is estimated using the sub-sample of household heads and 
specifications 4-6 are estimated using the sub-sample of single-person households. Summary statistics for the control variables included in all 
regressions and full regression results are available from the authors on request.   
 
 
Table 2. Trade union membership, the effects of the crisis, and GDP growth in 2009 – 
OLS coefficients 
 No longer 
working in 
the main job 
Was fired or 
made 
redundant 
Head of 
household lost 
job due to crisis 
Working hours 
reduced 
Wages delayed 
or suspended 
Wages 
reduced 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Trade union member -0.017* -0.011** -0.005 0.088* 0.139** 0.153** 
Union member*GDP growth 0.0033*** -0.0003 0.0036** 0.0041 0.0123** 0.0072 
       
Socio-demographic controls       
Job/firm characteristics       
Country indicators       
       
Observations 9,497 9,488 5,443 1,248 1,248 1,248 
R2 0.127 0.028 0.096 0.104 0.083 0.174 
F (Prob > F) 12.17(0.000) 2.253(0.000) 5.535(0.000) 1.954(0.000) 2.217(0.000) 6.171(0.000) 
       
 
Notes: See notes of Table 1.   
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Table 3. Trade union membership and the effects of the crisis by geo-political bloc – 
probit marginal effects 
 
No longer 
working in 
the main job 
Was fired or 
made 
redundant 
Head of 
household lost 
job due to crisis 
Working hours 
reduced 
Wages delayed 
or suspended 
Wages 
reduced 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
EU members  -0.051*** -0.006 -0.036** 0.047 0.009 0.018 
       
Aspiring EU countries -0.034* -0.004 -0.062*** 0.481*** 0.185* 0.203** 
       
EU periphery -0.037*** -0.019*** -0.014 0.055 0.100 0.203*** 
       
 
Notes: Results are based on 18 regressions (six model specifications for three country groups), reporting only the average marginal effects for the 
trade union member dummy. See also notes of Table 1.  
 
 
